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ABSTRACT
Chinese ways of dealing with seeming contradictions result in a dialectical or
compromise approach—retaining basic elements of opposing perspectives by seeking a
“middle way.” European-American ways, on the other hand, deriving from a lay version of
Aristotelian logic, result in a differentiation model that polarizes contradictory perspectives
in an effort to determine which fact or position is correct. Empirical studies showed that
dialectical thinking is a form of folk wisdom in Chinese culture: Chinese preferred
dialectical proverbs containing seeming contradictions more than did Americans. Chinese
were also found to prefer dialectical resolutions to social conflicts, and to prefer dialectical
arguments over classical Western logical arguments. Furthermore, when two apparently
contradictory propositions were presented, Americans polarized their views and Chinese
were moderately accepting of both propositions. Origins of these cultural differences and
their implications for human reasoning in general are discussed.
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Consider the following statements about recent scientific discoveries:
Statement A. Two mathematicians have discovered that the activities of a butterfly in
Beijing, China, noticeably affect the temperature in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Statement B. Two meteorologists have found that the activities of a local butterfly in the
San Francisco Bay Area have nothing to do with temperature changes in the same San Francisco
Bay Area.
What would be your intuitive reaction to these statements?  Do you see an implicit
contradiction between the two pieces of information?  What strategy would you use to deal
with such contradictions?  What is the rationale for using such a strategy?  Does your
cultural background affect your reasoning and judgments about contradiction?  If so, how?
Theoretically, there are four possible psychological responses to apparent
contradiction. The first, and perhaps easiest, is not to deal with contradiction at all, or to
pretend that there is no contradiction, a psychological stance that could be labeled denial. A
second approach is to distrust or discount both pieces of information because they seem to
contradict each other, a stance that could be called discounting. However, both of these
stances can be counter-normative because the full set of information might have important
implications for behavior.
A third response involves comparing both items of information, then deciding that
one is right and the other is wrong. Psychologists have found that, in group decision-
making, people exposed to opposing propositions often increase their preference for the
proposition they were inclined to believe initially and decrease their preference for the less
favored proposition (see Isenberg, 1986; Kaplan, 1987; for reviews). Psychologists have
also found that people sometimes change opinions in order to reduce the cognitive
dissonance caused by two contradictory cognitions. Such polarizing strategies could be
characterized as differentiation.
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Theoretically, however, a fourth response to contradiction is possible: a person
might retain basic elements of the two opposing perspectives and believe that both
perspectives might contain some truth, even at the risk of tolerating a contradiction. Such an
approach would not regard the two statements about the association between the activities
of a butterfly and temperature changes as a contradiction, but would rather attempt a
reconciliation, with the result that both are believed to be true. This cognitive tendency
toward acceptance of contradiction could be defined broadly as dialectical thinking. We
address four questions about dialectical thinking in this paper: 1) Is tolerance of seeming
contradictions a real form of dialectical thinking?  2) What are the principles underlying
dialectical thinking? 3) Are there cultural differences in the way people reason about
contradiction? 4) What are the psychological and social implications of various approaches
to reasoning about apparent contradictions?
We explore dialectical thinking by comparing lay Chinese reactions to apparent
contradictions to those of lay Americans. We argue that reasoning about contradiction is
guided by tacit ontologies or folk wisdom about the nature of the world. Chinese believe the
world is in constant flux and that the part cannot be understood except in relation to the
whole (e. g., Nakamura, 1964/1978). Both change and complexity imply contradiction.
Chinese deal with contradiction by what might a compromise approach, showing tolerance of
contradiction by finding a “middle way” by which truth can be found in each of two
competing propositions. Westerners believe in constancy of the world, and believe it is
possible to decontextualize propositions, understanding them just in relation to one another
rather than attending also to a larger field of facts and theories in which they are embedded
(e. g., Cromer, 1993; Logan, 1986). Contradictory propositions are unacceptable by the laws
of formal logic which have been part of the Western tradition since Aristotle, and Westerners
respond to propositions that have the appearance of contradiction by differentiation—
deciding which of two propositions is correct.
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DIALECTICAL THINKING AND NAÏVE DIALECTICISM
Dialectical Thinking in Western Philosophy and Psychology
There is a long tradition of concern with dialectical reasoning in Western philosophy
and more recently in the psychological literature (reviewed recently by Peng, 1997; in press).
Dialectical thinking is considered to consist of sophisticated approaches towards seeming
contradictions and inconsistencies. The key feature of Western dialectical thinking is
integration, starting with the recognition of contradiction, then moving on to the
reconciliation of basic elements of the opposing perspectives. Its rational foundation is still
the law of non-contradiction, so that a satisfactory solution to contradiction is a non-
contradictory one.
The best-known dialectical tradition in philosophy is that of Marx and Engels, who
applied dialectical perspectives to the analysis of civilization and cultures. In their scheme,
a proposition or historical fact (thesis) gives rise to an opposing one (antithesis), which is
resolved by a synthesis. Marxist dialectical thought emphasized the permanence of
opposition and contradiction in the real material world, and therefore in thought about
reality. According to Marx and Engels, the process of historical development is endless
because the synthesis itself becomes a new thesis and is in turn negated by a new antithesis
producing a new synthesis, and so on ad infinitum. The dialectics of Marx and Engels can
be characterized as "aggressive" or "assertive" in that there is constant negation.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a school of developmental psychologists started to
look for cognitive development beyond Piaget's adolescent "formal operations" stage. Klaus
Riegel (1973) argued that adult thought, particularly creative scientific activities, "are
dominated by playful manipulations of contradictions and by conceiving issues integratively
which have been torn apart by formal operational thinking (p. 363)." An empirical approach
to dialectical thinking was offered by Michael Basseches (1980; 1984), who abstracted 24
"dialectical schemata," such as recognition of part-whole relationships, reciprocal
relationships, and the progression thesis-antithesis-synthesis (Basseches, 1980). It has been
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found that dialectical thinking becomes increasingly important and common with age (e.g.,
Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Basseches, 1984; Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Kramer &
Woodruff, 1986). Middle-aged and older people are more likely to accept contradiction in
reality and to synthesize contradiction in their thinking than are young people. An allied
tradition in the field of individual differences focuses on “integrative complexity” (Tetlock,
1983, 1985), or ability to view problems from multiple perspectives and use multiple rules
for thinking about them.
The philosophical tradition and the psychological one make similar fundamental
assumptions. They regard contradiction as a temporary state that will be replaced by
integrated thoughts—using reasoning that is linear, logical, and moves in one direction—
from a contradiction to a synthesis. (Even Marx and Engles' constant negation assumes at
least temporary integration.) They also assume that integration or synthesis are higher levels
of cognitive functioning, such as philosophical ways of thinking—sophisticated, advanced
models of thought used by older, wiser people and cognitive elites. They are still
constrained by the laws of formal logic, which do not tolerate literal contradiction.
Dialectical Thinking in Chinese Thought
The Chinese have had an enduring reputation for being dialectical thinkers,
reasoning in ways that are distinct from the formal logic paradigm dominating the Western
tradition (e.g., Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990; Needham, 1962; Zhang & Chen, 1991). Due to the
very nature of the approach, it is difficult to identify the principles of Chinese dialectical
epistemology -- the concepts and rules are highly flexible, with a multiplicity of meanings
and functions. Hence the existence of such a tradition has been generally assumed but never
proven, and the contents of such principles have been touched on occasionally (e.g., Zhang
& Chen, 1991), but never explicitly theorized.
We take a rather non-dialectical approach in order to decompose Chinese dialectical
epistemology. This approach, we have to admit, is analytic and logical, and not consistent
with the spirit of dialectical thinking. The principles identified may not cover all aspects of
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Chinese dialectical epistemology, but only the ones that are the easiest to abstract and
analyze for the purpose of empirical research.
Principle of change (Bian Yi Lu).This principle holds that reality is a process. It does
not stand still but is in constant flux. According to Chinese folk belief, existence is not static
but dynamic and changeable. At the deepest level of Chinese philosophical thinking, "to be
or not to be" is not the question because life is a constant passing from one stage of being to
another, so that to be is not to be, and not to be is to be (e.g., Cao, 1982; Liu, 1988; Wang,
1987). Because reality is dynamic and flexible, the concepts that reflect reality are also
active, changeable, and subjective rather than being objective, fixed, and identifiable
entities.
Principle of contradiction (Mao Dun Lu ). This principle states that reality is not
precise or cut-and-dried but is full of contradictions. Because change is constant,
contradiction is constant. Old and new, good and bad, strong and weak, and so on, co-exist
in everything. One of the first mandatory books for literate ancient Chinese was the Yi Jing
/I-Ching (The Book of Changes), in which the principle of contradiction is clearly
expressed. For example, its basic theme is that the world is simply a single entity, integrated
over opposites. The founder of the Daoist school, Lao-zi (570?-490?BC/1993), said: "When
the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recognition of ugliness;
When they all know the good as good, there arises the recognition of evil. And so, being
and nonbeing produce each other…. (p. 16)." According to the Daoists, the two sides of any
contradiction exist in an active harmony, opposed but connected and mutually controlling.
Principle of relationship or holism (Zheng He Lu). This principle probably
constitutes the essence of dialectical thinking. It is a consequence of the principles of
change and contradiction. It holds that nothing is isolated and independent, but everything is
connected. If we really want to know something fully, we must know all of its relations --
how it affects and is affected by everything else. Or, to borrow a slogan from Gestalt
psychology, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Anything regarded in isolation is
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distorted because the parts are meaningful only in their relations to the whole, like
individual musical notes embedded in a melody. The holistic mode of thought rests on the
assumption that everything exists in mystical integration of yin and yang, entities that are
opposed to one another and yet also are connected in time and space as a whole.
Contrast Between Dialectical Thinking and Formal Logic
The three principles of Chinese dialectical thinking are related. It is because of
change that contradiction becomes inevitable; it is because change and contradiction are
inevitable that it is meaningless to discuss the individual part without considering its
relationships with other parts. To many people in the West, this description may sound
interesting, reasonable, and even a bit familiar, particularly the idea of holism. However,
when one contrasts the principles of Chinese dialectical thinking with the laws of formal
logic, the significance of the cultural difference becomes obvious. The rational foundation
of Chinese dialectical thought is quite different from the rational foundation of Western
thought (including Western dialectical thought). Western thought rests in substantial part on
Aristotelian logic, which emphasizes three different principles: the law of identity, the law
of noncontradiction, and the law of the excluded middle.
The law of identity. This law holds that if anything is true, then it is true; thus A =
A. In other words, everything must be identical with itself. Leibniz has given expression to
the law of identity that "Everything is what it is."  For example, "A student is a student" is a
logical assertion because "student" and "student" are identical.
The law of noncontradiction. This law declares that no statement can be both true
and false; thus A ≠ ¬ A. For example, "A student is not a non-student" is an expression of
the law of non-contradiction because "student" and "non-student" are contradictory, hence
cannot both be true. Other common expressions of the law are that “Contradictory
statements (e.g., A is B, A is not B) cannot both be true,” and that "It is impossible for the
same thing to be both true and false at the same time." Aristotle actually declared the law of
noncontradiction to be the first and most certain of all three laws of logic.
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The law of the excluded middle. This law expresses the rule that any statement is
either true or false; thus (A v B) & ¬  (A & B). A common expression of this law of the
excluded middle is "A is either B or not-B."  For example, "A person must either be a
student or non-student" because "student" and "non-student" are mutually contradictory and
complementary so that anybody must belong to either one of these two categories. Other
expressions of the law of the excluded middle are that “Of two contradictory judgments (A
is B, A is not B) the one must be true, the other false,” and Aristotle's statement that
"Between the two members of a contradiction, there is no middle term.”
Differences between the two traditions. It is obvious now to readers that these laws
of formal logic are not congruent with the principles of Eastern naïve dialecticism. For
instance, the principle of change suggests that life is a constant passing from one stage of
being to another, so that to be is not to be, and not to be is to be. The law of identity, on the
other hand, assumes cross-situational consistency; A must be A regardless of the context.
According to Chinese belief, the law of non-contradiction of formal logic works
only in the realm of concepts and abstraction. Even in these cases, the rejection of
conceptual contradiction based on formal logic can be mistaken, because concepts are
reflections of things. As Liu (1974) put it, “... it is precisely because the Chinese mind is so
rational that it refuses to become rationalistic and...refuses to separate form from content
(p.325).”  There is nothing which does not contain contradiction, and, therefore, there is no
concept which does not contain contradiction. A student, in many ways, is not a student, as
illustrated by the experience of many graduate student instructors.
Finally, if change and contradiction are constant, then real understanding of truth
and reality must be relational. Hence, for a dialectical thinker, both A and B may be right,
or both A and B may equal a third element C that may not be part of the initial
contradiction. We believe such fundamental differences in ontology and epistemology lead
to substantial cognitive differences. We expected that Western stances for dealing with
contradiction should be consistent with Westerners’ intuitive understanding of the law of
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noncontradiction, whereas the Chinese stances for dealing with contradiction should be
based on naïve dialecticism. Five studies were designed to demonstrate the effects of
culture-specific epistemology on reasoning about apparent contradictions.
FOLK WISDOM AND CONTRADICTION
A shortcut for studying culture-specific habits of thought is to study folk wisdom as
embodied in proverbs. Proverbs have been defined as short expressions of cultural wisdom,
truth, morals and norms in a "metaphorical, fixed and memorable form" which are shared
and "handed down from generation to generation" (Mieder, 1993, p. 5). Proverbs can sum
up a situation, pass judgment, recommend a course of action, or serve as past precedents for
present action (Taylor, 1965). Anthropologists have often studied proverbs in different
cultures and contexts as public representations of cultural wisdom (see Dundes, 1989).
Study 1:  Differential Preferences for Dialectical Proverbs
Study 1 was designed to show that dialectical thinking is reflected in Chinese folk
wisdom, and that dialectical proverbs are more common in Chinese everyday language than
in American everyday language and more preferred by Chinese than by Americans.
Examples of proverbs containing contradictions include "Beware of your friends not your
enemies," which contradicts the very definition of friendship, and the proverb "Too humble
is half proud," which explicitly contradicts the very meaning of the word “humble.” In
comparison, a non-dialectical proverb has no such contradiction. For example, the proverb
"One against all is certain to fall" stresses the inequality of one versus many; the proverb
"For example is no proof" makes a distinction between mere examples and more convincing
proofs. Such proverbs may surprise or prompt thought, but they contain no internal
contradiction, nor do they point to the inevitability of opposing factors in everyday
existence.
Method
Participants. Participants were 70 white American undergraduate students (US
citizens) at the University of Michigan and 41 Chinese undergraduate students from Taiwan
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who identified themselves as Chinese and were currently attending the same university, and
who were comparable in age, gender, and GPA.
Materials. Two compendia of proverbs were selected as the sources of the stimuli
(Hirsch, Kett, & Trefil, 1988; Lian, 1964). Proverbs were coded as dialectical and non-
dialectical by four trained coders having inter-coder reliability of .92 as indicated by
Kendall's index of harmony. Eight Chinese and eight American dialectical proverbs were
randomly selected from the pools of dialectical proverbs agreed upon by all four coders.
Five Chinese and five American non-dialectical proverbs were also randomly selected from
the rest of the Chinese and American proverbs as controls. Both the dialectical and non-
dialectical English proverbs were translated into Chinese by an independent translator who
was fluent in both languages. The Chinese proverbs were already translated by that book's
author (Lian, 1964).
Procedure. Participants made four judgments:  1) "How familiar is this proverb to
you in exact words?",  2) "How well do you think you understand this proverb?",  3) "How
much do you like this proverb?",  and 4) "How often do you use this proverb?"  Participants
rated their responses on a 7 point scale ranging from "not at all" (1) to "very much" (7).
Results
We found that there were nearly four times as many dialectical proverbs in the
Chinese book (about 12%) as in the American book (fewer than 3%), suggesting that
contradiction plays a larger role in Chinese than in American folk wisdom. The pattern of
participants' judgments on all four questions -- familiarity, comprehensibility, usage and
likability--was the same, so an index of overall preference for each proverb was created by
taking the mean of the four judgments. The means of these indices were submitted to a 2
(culture) X 2 (type of proverb) X 2 (language) omnibus analysis of variance, broken down
by culture and type of proverb. The means are illustrated in Figure 1. We found a
significant main effect of Culture such that the American participants showed a dislike of
the Chinese proverbs, regardless of whether they were dialectical or non-dialectical,
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whereas the Chinese rated the American proverbs as favorably as the Chinese ones, F (1,
109) = 8.59, p < .01.1 Perhaps the Chinese students who were studying in the US were self-
selected for liking American culture or had simply developed a taste for it. The major
prediction was supported by a significant three-way interaction of Culture by Language by
Type of Proverb; Americans greatly preferred non-dialectical to dialectical American
proverbs, and the Chinese preferred dialectical to non-dialectical Chinese proverbs, F (1,
109) = 12.45, p < .001.
Study 2:  Differential Preferences for Dialectical Yiddish Proverbs
It is possible that the results of Study 1 might be due to mere familiarity. The
Chinese might simply have had more exposure to the dialectical Chinese proverbs and
Americans to the non-dialectical American proverbs. More linguistically neutral, unfamiliar
proverbs were chosen for a follow-up study, namely Yiddish proverbs.
Method
Participants. Participants were 32 Chinese and 34 white (non-Jewish) American
natural science graduate students living in the University of Michigan Family Housing. The
two groups were comparable in age, gender, and education.
Materials and procedure. The same coders who worked on Study 1 were asked to
mark each proverb that they thought was dialectical. Eight dialectical proverbs and eight
non-dialectical proverbs were randomly selected from a Yiddish dictionary of proverbs
(Ayalti, 1963). Proverbs were presented to all participants in their English form. The
instructions and procedure were the same as in Study 1.
Results
The means for the general preference indices are presented in Figure 2. We found a
significant interaction of Culture by Type of Proverb indicating a significant cultural
difference in responses to the dialectical Yiddish proverbs, which the Chinese preferred
more than Americans did, and no difference regarding non-dialectical Yiddish proverbs, F
(1, 64) = 9.17, p < .01. The results can be seen in Figure 2.
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RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS
Social contradiction can be defined loosely as a condition in which two parties or
two aspects of one social system (e.g., a relationship, an institution, or a social function) are
in conflict with each other. Interpersonal conflicts are examples of social contradiction.
Cross-cultural comparisons of indigenous preferences for conflict resolution methods have
shown strong cultural variations, with Asians favoring harmonious procedures. For
example, Leung (1987; Leung & Lind, 1986) found that Chinese participants in his studies
were more in favor of resolving disputes through informal procedures, such as mediation
and bargaining, because they believed that such methods reduce animosity whereas
Americans were more likely than Chinese to favor adversarial methods of conflict
resolution.
We suspected that Chinese might adopt a compromise approach towards social
contradictions because of their naïve dialecticism. If the Chinese really have a holistic
approach towards life and a tendency to tolerate contradiction, then they would be less
likely to take sides in a conflict and perhaps not even to regard a social conflict as a
contradiction. Ethnographic analyses of Chinese law practices have suggested that Chinese
law permits the "middleman" to become the key figure in Chinese legal disputes, while
barring the way for Western-model lawyers and the rule of impersonal law which often
requires that only one party may win (Hsu, 1981). The dialectical resolution of social
contradiction is encouraged by an aspect of Chinese culture, namely the Doctrine of the
Mean, which emphasizes moderation, sincerity, and, most importantly, a “reasonable”
middle of the road approach. In dealing with social contradiction, it is not enough that a
proposal or solution be "logically correct," or "true," or "effective."  It is much more
important that it be "reasonable."
Study 3: Dialectical Resolution of Social Contradictions
In Study 3, participants from both cultures were asked to write down what they
thought about two everyday life contradictions, including the origin and resolution of the
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conflict. Their responses were then coded as dialectical or non-dialectical. Our prediction
was that the Chinese would apply the “doctrine of the mean” in their analysis of the social
contradiction whereas Americans would be less likely to do so. Participants were the same
32 Chinese graduate students and 34 American graduate students as in Study 2.
Method
Two everyday life scenarios were provided for participants to analyze: one was a
mother-daughter value conflict and the other was a conflict between having fun and going
to school (see Appendix A for the texts, which were drawn from Basseches, 1984). A
simple coding scheme was created for analyzing participants' responses that distinguishes
dialectical resolution from non-dialectical resolution of each contradiction. A dialectical
response was defined as one which 1) addressed the issues from both sides, and 2)
attempted to reconcile the conflicts from by compromising. A dialectical resolution usually
included sentences that attributed the cause of the problem to both sides and attempted to
reconcile the contradiction, for example, a response such "Both the mothers and the
daughters have failed to understand each other." Nondialectical responses generally found
exclusive fault with one side or the other, for example, “mothers have to recognize
daughters’ right to their own values.” The inter-coder reliability was measured by Kendall's
index of harmony. The  indices were .89 (p < .01) for the Chinese responses and .84 (p <
.01) for the American responses.
Results
We found that cultural differences in dealing with social contradiction were
remarkably strong, as can be seen in Figure 3. For the mother-daughter conflict, many more
American responses were coded as non-dialectical (74%) than as dialectical (26%), z (n =
34) = 2.74, p < .01. In contrast, for the same conflict, many more Chinese responses were
coded as dialectical (72%) than as non-dialectical (28%), z (n=32) = 2.47, p < .05. A 2 X 2
Chi-square test showed that the cultural differences were highly significant, χ2 (1, 64) =
13.61, p < .001. For the school-fun conflict, many more American responses were coded as
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non-dialectical (88%) than dialectical (12%), z (n=34) = 4.45, p < .001. Although an almost
equal number of Chinese responses were coded as dialectical and non-dialectical, the
cultural differences were still significant, χ2 (1, 64) = 8.50, p < .01.
The results of Study 3 indicate that cultural differences in dealing with social
contradiction at the interpersonal level may be substantial. Most of the American
participants' resolutions of contradictions in everyday life were non-compromising, blaming
one side for the causes of the problems, demanding changes from one side to attain a
solution, and offering no compromise in dealing with interpersonal conflicts. In contrast,
most of the Chinese responses were much more dialectical, usually blaming both sides and
preferring a compromise approach to resolve the contradictions.
FORMAL ARGUMENTATION
It has been suggested by scholars in many fields of science that the Chinese and
people from other Eastern Asian cultures are less likely than Westerners to engage in
debates and formal argumentation (e.g., Becker, 1986; Nakamura, 1964). There are social,
historical, linguistic, and philosophical barriers to the acceptance of argumentation and
debate as a method of intellectual discourse or as a strategy for the consideration of new
proposals for social or political change (Becker, 1986). Some of the barriers are easy to
identify, such as the Chinese emphasis on harmony and hierarchy, and the lack of proper
forums or institutions for debate. Others are more philosophically rooted, such as the
influence of naïve dialecticism, which assumes that there can be some truth to both of two
opposing propositions, and hence implies that no side should win in a debate. Perhaps most
importantly, naïve dialecticism implies that concepts and words are flexible and only
auxiliary to human actions, and hence verbal debate and argumentation are not meaningful
tools for understanding truth and reality.
Study 4: Differential Preferences for Argument Forms
In Study 4 we attempted to address the question of whether Chinese preferences for
dialectical thinking affect the way they approach matters of formal argumentation. Which
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are more persuasive to the Chinese: logical arguments or dialectical arguments?  Do
Chinese scientists accept logical argument for scientific questions as much as American
scientists?  In Study 4, American and Chinese participants were asked to judge two types of
arguments which reached the same conclusions. These arguments were similar in length,
style, and structure. Both started from issues and premises, and then proceeded to examples
and conclusions. The difference was that one argument applied the law of non-contradiction
whereas the other applied naïve dialecticism, namely the principle of holism. We
hypothesized that Americans would be more favorable toward arguments complying with
the law of non-contradiction and that Chinese would be relatively more favorable toward
dialectical arguments.
Method
Participants. The 32 Chinese and 34 American natural science graduate students
from Studies 2 and 3 also participated in Study 4. It is important to note that none of the
participants were physicists.
Materials and procedure. Two types of arguments -- logical and dialectical -- were
used in Study 4 (see Appendix B for full texts of these arguments). One argument was
Galileo's famous discussion concerning the falsity of Aristotle's assumption that a heavier
object falls to ground first. A modern version of Galileo's thought experiment was used
(adapted from Fisher, 1986): Suppose one puts a heavier object on top of a lighter object: as
a joint entity, they should fall faster than the heavier object alone according to Aristotle's
assumption. However, in the joined entity, the lighter object is below the heavier object so it
should also act as a “brake” to slow down the heavier object, making both fall slower than
the heavier object alone. Because this is a contradiction, the initial assumption by Aristotle
must be false. A parallel dialectical argument was generated to argue the same position but
applying the principles of holism and stressing the importance of contexts. The argument
suggested that since Aristotle isolated objects from possible surrounding factors (e.g., wind,
weather and height), his initial assumption must be wrong. 
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The logical argument for the existence of God is another modified version of a
classical argument (adapted from Fisher, 1986), cited (but ultimately rejected) by David
Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. It uses the law of non-contradiction to
argue "the first causality" of the universe, suggesting that since everything has a cause, and
a mere succession of causes and effects is impossible, there must be a first or ultimate cause
of the universe which must be God. The dialectical argument applying the principle of
holism argues that when two people see a cup from opposite perspectives, one sees a cup
with a handle, and the other sees a cup without a handle. But there must be a God above
individual perspectives who can see all and who decides the truth. The participants were
instructed to read the two arguments for each topic, then to indicate "Which argument is
more persuasive (convincing) to you personally?" and 2) "Which argument do you like
more?"
Results
Figure 4 shows that American participants preferred the arguments that applied the
law of non-contradiction and Chinese participants preferred the arguments that applied the
principle of holism. We used participants' judgments of both persuasiveness and likability
as indications of preference and summed the two judgments across the two issues to create a
single index based on responses to the four questions which could range from 0 (no
dialectic preference on any item to 4 (greater dialectic preference for all four items. It was
found that Chinese preferred the dialectical arguments (Mean = 2.22, SD = 1.07) more than
did the Americans (Mean = 1.56, SD = 1.05), t (1, 65) = 2.53, p < .05.
Inasmuch as the Chinese participants, like the American participants, were scientists
living in the West, it is particularly striking that they preferred the dialectical arguments,
even for the scientific topic. These findings demonstrate again the power of folk theories in
the scientific understanding of physical phenomena (e.g., Champagne, Klopfer, &
Anderson, 1980; McCloskey, 1983; Peng & Nisbett, 1996).
JUDGMENTS ABOUT CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION
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Empirical studies conducted in Western cultural contexts have found that people
exposed to two items of contradictory information often increase their preference for the
item of information they were inclined to believe initially and decrease their preference for
the less favored item. Such a tendency has been characterized as "group polarization" in the
group decision making literature (see Isenberg, 1986; Kaplan, 1987; for reviews) and
"disconfirmation bias" in the cognitive literature (e.g., Edwards & Smith, 1996; Lord, Ross,
& Lepper, 1979). But do Chinese have different tendencies regarding contradictory
information?  A dialectic stance implies that Chinese would not show polarization and
disconfirmation biases but rather a tendency to tolerate contradiction.
Study 5:  Differential Approaches towards Contradiction
In Study 5, we presented apparently contradictory research findings on various
topics. The purpose was to determine whether Chinese and Americans have different
approaches for dealing with contradiction in scientific matters. The expectation was that
when presented with opposing items of information, Americans would use a differentiation
strategy, deciding that one of the sides was correct and the other was not, whereas Chinese
would use a compromise strategy, finding truth in both sides.
Method
Participants. One hundred and two American undergraduate students at the
University of Michigan and 136 undergraduate students at Beijing University participated in
this study. The two groups were comparable in age and gender composition, and received
course credit for their participation.
Materials. The information was presented in the form of brief descriptions of the
findings of scientific studies. The opposing statements were superficially incompatible but
were not true contradictions of one another. This left room for a dialectical approach -- for
finding some degree of truth to both statements. The first issue concerned whether strong or
weak family ties are optimal for individual social ability. The second issue was about
smoking and weight. Two findings were presented, one of which suggested a high
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correlation between smoking and being thin and the other of which suggested otherwise.
The third issue concerned whether eating "white meat" is healthier than eating no meat at
all. The fourth issue dealt with whether older or younger inmates should be released first in
a prison overcrowding crisis. The fifth issue concerned whether there is currently a trend
toward global warming. The statements are presented in Appendix C.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In two of
the conditions, participants only read information on one side of the five contradictions (A
or B), so that their judgments of the plausibility of each finding could be regarded as
baseline judgments. In the third condition, participants read information on both sides (A
and B), so that they were confronted with a seeming contradiction. All participants were
instructed to indicate how much they believed each of the statements to be true on a 9-point
scale from 1 (strongly disbelieve) to 9 (strongly believe).
Results
Plausibility in no-contradiction conditions. The plausibility of each statement was
established by analyzing participants' ratings of their beliefs about the accuracy of each
statement in the “A” or “B” Conditions. The statement that received the higher rating in
each pair was defined as the more plausible one. It was found, somewhat surprisingly, that
the Americans and Chinese both had the same intuitions about which statement was more
plausible for each topic. (The more plausible statement is always the first listed in Appendix
C.) The mean of the participants' judgments on the five "more plausible" statements was
calculated as the aggregate rating of "more plausible findings" and the mean of participants'
judgments on the five "less plausible" statements as the aggregate rating for "less plausible
findings."  A 2 (Culture) X 2 (Condition) X 2 (Plausibility) omnibus analysis of variance
(ANOVA) showed a significant interaction of Culture by Condition, F (1, 237) = 7.90, p <
.01, indicating that the American and Chinese judgments about the contradictory
information were differentially influenced by the contradictions.
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Culture-specific effects of contradiction. It may be seen in Figure 5a that American
participants followed a differentiation approach toward contradictory information. The
difference was entirely due to higher plausibility ratings for the "more plausible"
statements, F (1, 101) = 5.10, p < .05, and there was no difference for ratings of the "less
plausible" statements. Thus, Americans presented with evidence against a plausible state of
affairs actually judged it to be more likely than if they saw no contradictory evidence.
The aggregated ratings of plausibility by Chinese participants showed a quite
different pattern (Figure 5b), which suggests a compromise approach toward contradictory
information. In effect, the Chinese behaved as if they believed that both statements might be
(somewhat) true. This pattern was due both to higher ratings of the less plausible statements
in the "A and B" Condition, F (1, 101) = 6.90, p < .01, and to lower ratings for more
plausible statements, F (1, 101) = 6.53, p < .01. Thus, Chinese presented with evidence
against a rather implausible state of affairs actually judged it to be more plausible than if
they had not seen the evidence.
Discussion
The results of Study 5 clearly indicate that Americans and Chinese can have very
different approaches to dealing with contradictory information. American participants who
read brief accounts of two contradictory studies expressed beliefs that were more polarized
than those expressed by participants who read about only one study. Chinese participants
who read about two contradictory studies, in contrast, expressed beliefs that were
intermediate between those expressed by participants who read about only one of the
studies.
The explanation for this pattern that we prefer is that both groups used heuristics in
dealing with contradiction, but that these heuristics are culture-specific. For Americans, the
simple heuristic might be that, if there is an apparent contradiction between two opposing
perspectives, one must be right and the other must be wrong. The heuristic suggests that,
consistent with the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, you cannot have it both
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ways. For the Chinese, the pattern might be due to the dialectical reasoning style of
compromising between the elements of opposing perspectives. The Chinese heuristic for
dealing with apparent contradiction may consist of believing that both sides of a
contradiction might be right, and that the truth lies between the two perspectives. Such an
approach could be derived from the dialectical epistemology, which advocates tolerance of
seeming contradiction.
The results suggest that both Americans and Chinese are prone to make mistakes in
dealing with contradictory information. For the Americans, the mistake concerns the more
plausible statements. The American patterns found in Study 5 are reminiscent of the results
of a classic study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979). In that experiment, participants read
about two different studies concerning the deterrent value of capital punishment. The two
studies had different methodologies and came to opposite conclusions. Participants who
favored capital punishment believed that the study which found capital punishment to be
ineffective for deterrence was flawed methodologically; and they were little moved by its
conclusions. The same pattern of biased evaluation was found for opponents of capital
punishment who read the study indicating that capital punishment was effective.
Remarkably, after reading about the two contradictory studies, participants reported being
more convinced about the correctness of their initial view than were control subjects who
did not read about any study.
For the Chinese, the mistake concerns the less plausible statements. It can scarcely
be normatively correct to judge an implausible view as more plausible when one has just
read evidence for another, more plausible stance than if one has read only evidence
supporting the less plausible view. Nevertheless, this is what Chinese participants did in
Study 5.
The current findings are consistent with basic intellectual frameworks in both
cultures. Characteristics of Western thinking include: 1) pursuit of a single truth, 2)
construction of counterarguments, 3) preference for consistency. For Americans, since any
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argument can look better by comparison, there is a strong desire to generate
counterarguments against a position that one doubts, in order to find a more secure basis for
belief in some other position. A good part of Western education in fact consists of teaching
children how to generate arguments and counter-arguments concerning a given position. In
contrast, there is very little emphasis on constructing counter-arguments in the Asian
tradition (Becker, 1986; Yates & Lee, 1996; Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997). Instead, the
emphasis is on finding "the middle way" (Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990; Nakamura, 1965/1984).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have found empirical support for claims long made by scholars in a variety of
fields about the different intellectual traditions of East and West. The evidence provides
confirmation from the psychological laboratory to support the historical, ethnographic
and philosophical work suggesting that there are two very different cognitive traditions in
East and West regarding the treatment of seeming contradictions. The differences we
have found, it should be noted, are actual qualitative ones. Chinese preferred dialectic
proverbs whereas Americans preferred non-dialectical ones; Chinese preferred
compromise solutions to conflicts whereas Americans preferred non-compromising ones;
Chinese preferred dialectical arguments for a scientific proposition and a spiritual one
whereas Americans preferred logical arguments; Chinese moderated their views when
confronted with opposing propositions whereas Americans became more extreme. It
should also be noted that the differences we have found are almost surely muted with
respect to the Chinese and American populations as a whole. The Chinese participants
were all students and thus would have been exposed to Western forms of thought to a
greater degree than would be true of other Chinese. In addition, all except the
participants in Study 5 had been living in the U. S. for several years.
Holistic vs. Analytic Epistemologies
We believe that dialectic vs. non-dialectic reasoning will turn out to be only one
of a set of interrelated cognitive differences between Asians and Westerners. We and our
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colleagues are pursuing the general notion that East Asians influenced by the Chinese
cultural tradition are cognitively integral and holistic, attending to the perceptual and
cognitive field as a whole. In contrast, Westerners are prone to differentiate the object
from the field and to reason analytically about its behavior, categorizing it and using
rules about categories to understand its behavior (Nisbett, 1998; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, &
Norenzayan, 1999). There is now considerable evidence, for example, that causal
attribution differs across cultures, with Asians being inclined to attribute to context the
sorts of actions that Westerners attribute to dispositions of the object -- whether the
object is human (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1966; Miller, 1984;
Morris and Peng, 1994; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999; animal (Morris & Peng,
1994) or physical (Peng & Nisbett, in press). See Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan (1999),
Morris, Nisbett & Peng, 1995, and Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (in press) for reviews.
There is also evidence that Asians attend more closely to the field, whereas
Americans attend more closely to the focal object in the field. Abel and Hsu (1949)
found that Chinese Americans tended to give “whole card” responses on the Rorschach
whereas Caucasian Americans tended to give responses based on only a part of the card.
Ji, Peng, and Nisbett (1999) found that Chinese participants were more capable of
detecting covariation among arbitrary events than Americans, but more field dependent
as indicated by the fact that they were more influenced by the position of the frame when
judging the verticality of the rod in the Rod and Frame Test. In addition, Westerners
learn arbitrary categories more readily using rules (Norenzayan, Nisbett, Smith, & Kim,
1999), make more use of categories for purposes of induction than do Asians (Choi,
Nisbett, & Smith, 1997), are more likely to use categories for purposes of grouping
objects than to use relationships among the objects (Chiu, 1972; Ji & Nisbett, 1999;
Norenzayan, et al., 1999), and are more willing to set aside their preconceptions when
these are contradicted by logical argument (Norenzayan, et al., 1999).
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The tendency toward dialecticism of Easterners may thus be seen as part of a
general system of thought in which attention is directed outward toward the environment,
and complexity and change and contradiction are therefore salient. The Western tendency
toward logical reasoning may be seen as due to a focus on the object, with its presumably
fixed attributes, resulting in a general system of thought in which rules and categories
concerning the object are viewed as essential.
A Paradox in the History of Science
Our contention that East Asians are inclined toward holism and dialecticism whereas
Westerners are inclined toward analytic thought focusing on the object may be helpful in
resolving “Needham's paradox” (Capra, 1975; Needham, 1962; Zukav, 1980). British
historian of science Joseph Needham noted that the ancient Chinese had rich concepts
concerning "field" and "force over distance" and understood phenomena such as magnetism,
acoustic resonance, and the true reason for the tides more than 1,500 years before these
things were understood in the West. Such understanding would seem to flow from a focus
on the field and a commitment to holistic thought. However, the Chinese did not discover
the modern physics of electromagnetism or quantum physics (Needham, 1962).
One of the factors contributing to "Needham's paradox" could be naïve dialecticism.
By emphasizing change, contradiction, and covariation, naïve dialecticism restricts any
reductive, analytic, and logical quest for understanding nature and the world. The
reductionism of quantum physics recognizes one force, namely the mechanical force, as the
manifestation of momentum and energy exchange of all physical movements. According to
many historians of physics, it was because of the prior development of "billiard-ball"
physics that the modern scientific revolution could take place at the beginning of the 20th
century (e.g., Qian, 1985). Indeed, the major aims of Faraday, Lord Kelvin, and James
Maxwell were actually to eliminate "action at a distance" and provide electric and magnetic
actions with the tangibility of "billiard-ball interactions."  They initiated and mathematized
the concept of "field" and "forces over a distance" in the process of establishing
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electromagnetism and found that the force in a "field of force" is the same Newtonian force
that governs billiard-ball interactions (Qian, 1985). Such a linear persistence and logical
approach are not congruent with the principles of naïve dialecticism. This may be one of the
cognitive reasons, among many other factors, that the Chinese themselves did not develop
modern physics. Intriguingly, however, the dialectic orientation may have been important to
the development of modern quantum theory. At any rate, Nils Bohr maintained that his
thinking was influenced by Chinese metaphysical approaches (Bohr, 1958; 1958/1987).
Normative Questions
One of the inevitable questions stemming from this research is "Which approach to
dealing with contradiction is better, the (flawed) Chinese way or the (flawed) American
way?"  The best answer to such a linear question seems to be a dialectic one. On the one
hand, life is full of contradictions. Even in science, the concept of a "complex system"
reflects the reality of the world we are living in, a reality that is multi-layered,
unpredictable, and contradictory. Therefore, a dialectical approach may enable us to tolerate
and even appreciate contradiction, consequently maintaining a view of the big picture. On
the other hand, the dialectical approach may be accompanied by a tendency to accept too
much at face value, failing to generate counterarguments for a statement and trying to
reconcile opposing views, even when one viewpoint is inferior in terms of the evidence
supporting it.
It seems apparent that the Western, non-dialectical approach is more congruent with
Western scientific reasoning and research. In fact, the laws of formal logic form the
foundations of scientific investigation (e.g., Popper, 1959/1972). Many other intellectual
tasks in the West have been tacitly framed in adversarial terms so that results and
conclusions can be "falsified." This is true of the adversarial and argumentative approaches
that operate in law and public policy analysis.
The Western tradition of counterargument construction seems likely to result in
more specific hypotheses and consequently more solutions than naïve dialecticism could
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(Choi and Nisbett, 1999). Its emphasis on non-contradiction may also enable people to
reason rationally to reject false statements (even ones they may like) and accept true
statements (even ones they may not like). In fact, a large body of research on decision
making has shown that argument, debate, or conflict in general can improve decision
quality in Western societies (e.g., Johnson & Tjosvold, 1983; Janis & Mann, 1977; Mason
& Mitroff, 1981; Schwenk, 1990). Unfortunately, though, many Westerners may not know
their own strength or do not use it wisely. Their ability to generate counterarguments and
their fear of the appearance of contradiction may cause them to reject a statement simply
because they can readily generate counterarguments. Their analytic orientation may lead
them to focus too much on one side of an argument and to blind them to compromise
solutions—when the truth does indeed lie somewhere between or above the opposing facts
or viewpoints.
Therefore, the dialectical response to the linear question regarding which is the
better way of thinking is “it depends.” Paul Baltes has expressed to us the view that
logical ways of dealing with contradiction may be optimal for scientific exploration and
the search for facts because of its aggressive, linear, and argumentative style. On the
other hand, dialectical reasoning may be preferable for negotiating intelligently in
complex social interactions. Therefore, ideal thought tendencies might be a combination
of both -- the synthesis, in effect, of Eastern and Western ways of thinking.
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Appendix  A
Two vignettes used in Study 3
Mother-daughter conflict:
Mary, Phoebe, and Julie all have daughters. Each mother has held a set of values which has
guided her efforts to raise her daughter. Now the daughters have grown up, and each of them is
rejecting many of her mother's values. How did it happen and what should they do?
School-fun conflict:
Kent, James, and Matt are college juniors. They are feeling very frustrated about their three
years of routine tests, paper assignments, and grades. They complain that going through this process
has taken its toll, undermining the fun of learning. How did it happen and what should they do?
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Appendix B
Arguments used in Study 4
Galileo's argument against Aristotle's assumption
Aristotle believed that the heavier a body is, the faster it falls to the ground. However, such
an assumption might be false. Suppose that we have two bodies, a heavy one called H and a light
one called L. Under Aristotle's assumption H will fall faster than L. Now suppose that H and L are
joined together, with H on top of L. Now what happens?  Well, L + H is heavier than H so by the
initial assumption it should fall  faster than H alone. But in the joined body L + H , L and H will
each tend to fall just as fast as before they were joined, so L will act as a “brake” on H and L + H
will  fall slower than H alone. Hence it follows from the initial assumption that L + H will fall both
faster and slower than H alone. Since this is absurd the initial assumption must be false.
Dialectical argument against Aristotle's assumption
Aristotle believed that the heavier a body is, the faster it falls to the ground. However, such
an assumption might be false because this assumption is based on a belief that the physical object is
free from any influences of other contextual factors (“perfect condition”), which is impossible in
reality. Suppose that we have two bodies, a heavy one called H and a light one called L. If we put
two of them in two different conditions, such as H in windy weather (W) and L in quiet weather
(Q),  now what happens?  Well, the weights of the body, H or L, would not make them fall fast or
slow. Instead, the weather conditions, W or Q, would make a difference. Since these kinds of
contextual influences always exist, we conclude that the initial assumption must be false.
Hume's argument for the existence of the God
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence, since it is absolutely
impossible for anything to produce itself or be the cause of its own existence. In moving from
effects to causes, therefore, we must have two options. One is to go on in tracing an infinite
succession, without any ultimate cause at all;  the other is that we at last have recourse to some
ultimate cause that is necessarily existent. However, the first option is impossible. Because, in the
infinite chain of succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the
power and efficacy of  that cause which immediately preceded. But if the whole eternal chain of
succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by anything, this is absurd. Is nothing
the ultimate cause?  But that can never produce anything, which contradicts the cause-effect
succession we have. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being who carries
the reason of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express
contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being -- that is, there is a God.
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Dialectical argument for the existence of the God
Whatever exists must exist in its own time and location, and with unique properties.
Because of these facts, any particular entity would have entities competing with it and contradicting
it in terms of viewing the truth, just as two people watch a cup on the table, one sees a cup with a
handle, the other must see a cup without a handle if he is looking from the opposite perspective.
Then who is going to tell the truth?  It cannot be one of the particular entities because each one of
them can only see a part of the truth. Is nothing the ultimate truth?  But that can never tell us
anything. We know the truth will eventually come out. Therefore, there must be a way to add up all
the different perspectives to assist at an absolute truth. Such a sum or “whole” consists of every
idiosyncratic perspective, but reveals the truth as a whole. This marvelous “whole” cannot be
designed or found by any individual alone. We must, therefore, have  recourse to a necessarily
existent Being who is above every idiosyncratic entity, and who cannot be supposed not to exist as
argued above. There is, consequently, such a Being -- that is, there is a God.
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Appendix C
Contradictory findings used in Study 5
Statement 1A:
A social psychologist studied young adults and asserted that those who feel close to their
families have more satisfying social relationships.
Statement 1B:
A developmental psychologist studied adolescent children and asserted that those children who were
less dependent on their parents and had weaker family ties were generally more mature.
Statement 2A:
A sociologist who surveyed college students from 100 universities claimed that there is a
high correlation among college female students between smoking and being skinny.
Statement 2B:
A biologist who studied nicotine addiction asserted that heavy doses of nicotine often lead
to becoming overweight.
Statement 3A:
A health magazine survey found that people who live a long life eat some sorts of white
meat, e.g., fish or chicken.
Statement 3B:
A study by a health organization suggests that it is much more healthy to be a strict
vegetarian who does not eat meat at all.
Statement 4A:
A survey found that older inmates are more likely to be ones who are serving long sentences
because they have committed severely violent crimes. The authors concluded that they should be
held in prison even in the case of a prison population crisis.
Statement 4B:
A report on the prison overcrowding issue suggests that older inmates are less likely to
commit new crimes. Therefore, if there is a prison population crisis, they should be released first.
Statement 5A:
A group of environmental science undergraduate students examined fuel usage in a large
number of developing countries and asserted that recent practices are likely to multiply already
worsening environmental problems such as "global warming."
37
37
Statement 5B:
A meteorologist studied temperatures in 24 widely separated parts of the world and asserted
that temperatures had actually dropped by a fraction of a degree each of the last five years.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1.  Index of Preferences for American and Chinese Proverbs by American and
Chinese undergraduate students.
Figure 2.  Index of Preferences for Yiddish Proverbs by American and Chinese
Undergraduate Students.
Figure 3. Percent of Participants Preferring Dialectical Resolution.
Figure 4.  Percent of American and Chinese Participants Preferring Dialectical Arguments.
Figure 5a. American Participants Ratings of Plausibility in Both "A or B Conditions" and
"A and B Condition".
Figure 5b.  Chinese Participants Ratings of Plausibility in Both "A or B Conditions" and "A
and B Condition".
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Figure 1.  Index of Preferences for American and Chinese Proverbs by American and
Chinese undergraduate students
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Figure 2.  Index of Preferences for Yiddish Proverbs by American and Chinese
Undergraduate Students
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Figure 3. Percent of Participants Preferring Dialectical Resolution
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Figure 4.  Percent of American and Chinese Participants Preferring Dialectical Arguments
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Figure 5a. American Participants Ratings of Plausibility in Both "A or B Conditions" and
"A and B Condition"
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Figure 5b.  Chinese Participants Ratings of Plausibility in Both "A or B Conditions" and "A
and B Condition"
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 Footnotes
1
 All p levels are based on two-tailed tests.
